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abSTracT
this paper reviews the experimental economics literature on gender differences concerning four salient sub-
jects: risk aversion, trust, deception and leadership. We review both experiments conducted in a laboratory 
and field experiments. We summarize very briefly the main characteristics of the experiments we review and 
point out the main results related to gender differences. the vast majority of the articles we have revised 
document gender differences in behavior; differences which could be explained by sex-role stereotypes which 
could be formed even in early stages of life and/or hormonal differences such as the female hormone oxytocin 
or estrogen.  
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reSumen
este artículo revisa la literatura en el área de economía experimental sobre las diferencias de género en 
cuatro temas destacados: aversión al riesgo, confianza, engaño y liderazgo. Se revisan tanto experimentos 
realizados en laboratorios como experimentos de campo. Resumimos brevemente las principales caracte-
rísticas de los experimentos que consideramos y señalamos los principales resultados relacionados con las 
diferencias de género. la gran mayoría de los artículos que hemos revisado documentan diferencias de 
género en el comportamiento. estas diferencias podrían explicarse por los estereotipos de roles sexuales 
que podrían formarse incluso en edades tempranas  y / o diferencias hormonales como la hormona femenina 
oxitocina, o el estrógeno.
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inTroducTion
Decades of research in experimental economics has shown that the preferences of 
individuals and their economic behavior are quite heterogeneous. the literature has 
attempted to explain this heterogeneity as being due to different factors such as age, 
education, cultural differences, income levels and social status, among others. one of 
the most important factors that has been analyzed thoroughly is the role of gender in eco-
nomic behavior. Gender differences have been analyzed experimentally in many different 
areas of economics and under very different settings. recent surveys which review the 
literature on gender differences in experimental economics focus on different subjects, 
among them Croson and Gneezy (2009), Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Frank and 
Lambsdorff (2011). 
 Croson and Gneezy (2009) review experiments dealing with gender differences in 
risk, social and competitive preferences. Analyzing a large string of experiments, they 
observe that, in general, women are more risk averse than men, are more sensitive to 
social cues and have a lower preference for competitive environments. on the other 
hand, Eckel and Grossman (2008) review economic experiments that explore gender 
differences in the behavior of subjects in public goods, dictator and ultimatum games, 
observing no significant gender differences in behavior when subjects are exposed to 
risk. in the absence of risk, however, they do observe systematic gender differences, with 
women taking more socially-oriented decisions. Frank and Lambsdorff (2011) revise the 
literature of corruption experiments that focus on gender effects. their main observation 
is that when women are engaged in a corrupt transaction, this transaction is more likely 
to fail not because women are more honest, but because they behave more opportunisti-
cally when there is a possibility of breaking an implicit corrupt contract.  
 our review focuses on four subjects: gender differences in risk aversion, trust, decep-
tion and leadership. risk aversion and trust are probably two of the most widely-studied 
issues in experimental economics and constitute the fundamental elements of analysis 
in a vast number of economic experiments. for instance, trust plays a key role in experi-
ments on deception. When a subject can potentially deceive his partner(s), the behavior 
of the partner(s) will depend on whether they trust the subject or not. As regards leader-
ship, Gillespie and Mann (2004) show that trust influences satisfaction with leaders and 
their perceived effectiveness.
 economic experiments on deception have become one of the most salient issues in 
the last decade, while the analysis of gender differences has begun to gain greater atten-
tion in this specific literature. For this reason, we focus on gender differences in deception 
experiments in our review. 
 leadership is yet another salient issue in experimental economics. the effectiveness 
of managers is related to their ability to make decisions (Johnson and Powell 1994). 
Because managers must often make decisions in uncertain environments, managers’ 
risk aversion affects their decision-making ability. While the ability of a manager to take 
effective decisions largely determines the success of a firm, the propensity to take risks 
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may or may not be desirable depending on the circumstances. gender differences in 
decision-making or risk-taking behavior among men and women have consequences for 
organizations. Although there is a considerable amount of literature on this subject which 
focuses on gender differences, the experiments dealing with this issue have not been 
thoroughly revised. thus, this is another aim of our paper.    
 this paper reviews evidence on gender difference in risk aversion, trust, deception 
and leadership. The results are discussed in the final section.
gender diFFerenceS in riSK averSion
Under different environments and tasks, the majority of studies about gender differen-
ces in risk taking report the same conclusion: women are more risk averse than men 
(see Croson and Gneezy 2009, Table 1 for a review of the literature). However, several 
authors argue that this finding is specific to certain contexts. For example, Schubert, 
Brown, Gysler and Brachinger (1999) found that in a strongly ambiguous context, women 
are more risk averse where lotteries are framed as gains, while men are more risk averse 
when lotteries are framed as losses. They find no gender differences when the context is 
abstract or weakly ambiguous. 
 Explanations for gender differences are chiefly grounded in two theories: evolution 
and socialization. Evolutionary arguments hold that sex differences are dependent on 
reproduction (biology): men are more risk taking in the period when they are trying to 
attract mates, while women are more risk averse in the child-bearing period (Wood and 
Eagly 2002). Works that support this theory include those by Brody (1993), Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007), Soll and Klayman (2004) and Gysler, Brown-Kruse and Schubert 
(2002), among others.
  Brody (1993) affirms that in anticipation of negative outcomes, women report more 
nervousness and fear than men, thus it is logical that women are more risk averse 
when facing a risky situation. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Soll and Klayman 
(2004) have found that men are more overconfident than women. Thus, men have 
higher perceptions of the likelihood of a successful outcome in the gamble, and will 
be more likely to take the gamble. Gysler et al. (2002) explore investment decisions 
controlling for knowledge of financial markets and an overconfidence test. They found 
that when knowledge and overconfidence are controlled for, women do not exhibit 
higher risk aversion. Chen, Katuscak and Ozdenorem (2005) explore gender issues 
in first and second-price auctions. They find that women bid more aggressively in 
the first case but they cannot support any gender bias in the second case. They find 
biological proof for women’s behaviour: in the first-price auction, differences among 
women and men playing experimental auctions disappear when women are mens-
truating (when the estrogens level is lowest). The gender difference appears in other 
phases of the menstrual cycle. Brañas-Garza and Rustichini (2011) study the correla-
tion between the ratio of the second to the fourth finger (2D:4D digit ratio), a marker 
indicating early exposure to testosterone, and risk aversion. for male subjects they 
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find that the correlation is positive and significant, however, for female the correlation 
is not significant. 
 The socialization theory is not wholly focused on biology, but on cultural and social 
practices. Because men and women tend to have different social roles, they become psy-
chologically different to adjust to their social roles (Eagly and Wood 1999). Meier-Pesti 
and Penz’s paper (2008) support this theory. They affirm that, regardless of biological 
sex, risk aversion is associated with feminine attributes. for both sexes, higher scores 
on femininity (measured through gender identification and sex role tests) reduce the ten-
dency to take risk. Eckel and Grossman (2002) argue that if women are stereotyped as 
more risk averse, this could affect them negatively in many aspects ranging from lower 
wages to less aggressive health treatments. 
 several studies have shown that gender differences are attenuated by experience 
and profession. Using a sample of mutual fund managers, atkinson, Baird and frye 
(2003) found no gender differences in the way funds are managed in terms of perfor-
mance and risk. Examining this same topic, Johnson and Powell (1994:129) found diffe-
rences among the non-managerial population, but did not observe such differences in 
the managerial population (managers and potential managers with management educa-
tion). They study the betting behaviour (on horses and dogs) observed in betting offices 
throughout the UK, claiming that this is “a real decision made in a natural environment” 
the subjects involved did not know that their behaviour was being observed. in this 
subject pool they found that men are more risk taking than women. in the managerial 
population, the subjects were asked to evaluate a project financially and decide whether 
or not to recommend it. in this subgroup no gender difference in risk taking was observed. 
gender diFFerenceS in TruST and reciProciTy 
Behaviour in trust games has been linked to general notions of trust and trustworthi-
ness. a review of studies on gender differences in trust and reciprocity shows contra-
dictory results. in the standard trust game one of the two players, the sender, decides 
how much money (if any) to send to the other player, the receiver. The experimenter 
then triples the amount sent and the receiver has to decide how much of the received 
amount (if any) to send back to the sender. Considering the amount sent as a measure 
of trusting behaviour, the majority of studies found that men are more trusting than 
women, while only one found no gender differences and few of them show that women 
are more trusting than men (see Croson and Gneezy 2009, Table 3). However, the 
fact that women send the same amount or less than men can be attributed either to 
lower trust or to higher risk aversion. With respect to reciprocity, the results generally 
find that women are more reciprocal than men or that there are no gender differences 
but there exist studies with the opposite result, for instance, using a latin american 
sample, Brañas-Garza, Cardenas and Rossi (2009) find that males are more generous 
than females.
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these contradictory results can be explained by the fact that women are more sensitive 
to what happens in the experiment. in both trust and reciprocal decisions, small differen-
ces in the experimental design affect female participants more than male ones. Buchan, 
Croson and Solnick (2008) find more variability in female behaviour. For example, if the 
counterpart is identified in the experiment, the amounts women send vary more than the 
amounts men send.
 Some studies consider the question “Do men and women trust men or women 
more?” that is, “Does the information about partner’s gender influence trust and recipro-
city?” The answer to this question is not clear. Eckel and Grossman (2001) and Garba-
rino and Slonim (2009) found that both women and men trust women more than men, 
whereas Buchan et al. (2008) did not find differences across gender. Bonein and Serra 
(2009) observed that participants did not discriminate in their trust behaviour based on 
the gender of their counterpart, but with regard to reciprocity:  the proportion returned is 
significantly larger when the trustor and the trustee are of the same gender. This type of 
information could be useful in achieving the highest efficiency between the members of a 
team and its leader. 
gender diFFerenceS in decePTion
in recent years, the analysis of gender differences in deception and lying behavior has 
drawn the attention of researchers in economics. experiments where subjects are given 
the possibility to lie or engage in cheap talk have become increasingly popular.  a string of 
research focusing on gender differences in deception follows the work of Gneezy (2005). 
In Gneezy’s experiment, subjects play in pairs where one player is the sender and the 
other the receiver. the receiver must choose between options a and B where each option 
has different monetary pay-offs associated to it. one option yields a higher pay-off to the 
sender than to the receiver, while under the other option it is the receiver who earns more 
than the sender. these monetary pay-offs are known only by the sender. the sender 
can send one of two possible messages to the receiver: 1) “Option A will earn you more 
money than option B”; or 2) “Option B will earn you more money than option A”. One 
message is true and the other message is a lie. after receiving the message, the receiver 
has to choose one of the two options. subjects are paid according to the option they 
choose. Dreber and Johannesson (2008) replicate this experiment to investigate gender 
differences in behavior, finding that men are significantly more likely than women to lie to 
obtain a higher monetary benefit. Regarding trust, however, they did not find any signifi-
cant differences in gender. the fractions of individuals that follow messages from men or 
women were not statistically different either.
 Kristinsson, Arnardóttir and Gylfason (2009) also used the same design to analyze 
the impact of personality on behavior in the deception game. contrary to Dreber and 
Johannesson (2008), however, they found no gender differences in lying.
 McGuire (2009) extended upon Gneezy’s design (2005) to include a third option and 
a third message. The third message could be defined as a “big lie”. Half of the subjects 
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play the Gneezy game (2005), whereas the other half plays the game with three possible 
messages. The first two options are comparable to the options in the original design. In 
contrast to the option that is more beneficial to the sender in the original design, the third 
option would slightly increase the sender’s pay-off, while considerably decreasing the 
receiver’s pay-off. the main result mcguire obtains is that only women were made less 
averse to lying due to the existence of the big lie. that is, the potential of the big lie had 
little effect on men partly because men lied more often than women when there were 
only two options. subjects also had to answer a survey question where they faced a very 
similar situation to the actual experiment. Both men and women felt that a small lie was 
less unfair when a big lie was also possible. 
 Tilley, George and Marett (2005) analyzed gender differences in both decep-
tion and the detection of deception in a job interview setting. in their experiments, 
subjects were assigned one of two roles: interviewer or job applicant. all of the 
subjects were asked to bring their résumés to the experiment. the résumés of the 
subjects assigned the role of job applicant were then modified and improved upon 
by the experimenters. in the interview, the job applicants had to use the résumé that 
included lies. the interviews were conducted in one of the following four manners: by 
e-mail, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), IRC with audio, or audio only over IRC. They found 
that there was a statistically significant difference in deception detection, with women 
being better at detection than men. their interpretation is that females may be more 
attentive to the communication process and thus would be able to observe more cues. 
However, significant differences were not found across genders in terms of successful 
deception. 
 Erat and Gneezy (2009) classify lies into three categories: “selfish black lies”, 
which would harm the receiver but benefit the sender; “altruistic white lies” that would 
harm the sender but help the receiver; and “Pareto improving white lies”, which would 
increase the monetary pay-offs of both players. As Dreber and Johannesson (2008), 
they found that men are significantly more likely to tell a selfish black lie. In contrast, 
women are more likely than men to tell an altruistic white lie, but less likely to tell a 
pareto white lie.
 Jamison, Karlan and Schechter (2008) analyzed the effect of deception employed 
by experimenters on subjects. it is a common agreement among economics scholars 
that subjects should not be deceived as they are a public good for all researchers and 
deceiving them today would affect their future actions in other experiments and also 
their decision to participate in them. In Jamison et al. (2008), experimental subjects 
played the standard trust game. some of the subjects played the game without any 
deception, whereas the others were deceived regarding the identity of their partner. 
they were told that they were playing with another student when in reality they were 
playing with a computer. after the experiment, the deceived subjects were told the 
truth. three weeks after this experiment all the participants in the experiment were 
invited to another experiment run by another researcher. When comparing the return 
rate of the deceived and non-deceived subjects, they found that gender differences 
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played an important role. The females who had been deceived were significantly less 
likely to participate in another experiment, whereas the men were significantly more 
likely to return.
 the existence of cheap talk can give a person the possibility to lie to another person 
if it is in his/her interest to do so. Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe and Johannesson (2009) 
focused on the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game. in this experiment, one of the 
two parts, the seller, has confidential information about his/her own skill. The level of 
skills is determined by a test measuring general knowledge. the seller can send a writ-
ten message to the other player, the buyer, regarding his/her own level of skills. after 
receiving the message, the buyer decides whether to offer the seller a fixed-payment 
contract or not. The buyer only obtains a positive benefit from the contract if the seller’s 
level of skills is above a certain threshold. thus, sellers with a level of skills that is 
lower than the threshold have incentives to lie. seventy percent of the sellers had a 
skill level below the threshold. the authors compared four treatments: one without 
cheap talk, one with free-form communication and two treatments with pre-specified 
communication. regarding the effect of gender, they found that although women are 
less likely to lie than men, the difference is not statistically significant.           
 
gender diFFerenceS in leaderShiP
many papers have found evidence of differences in leadership styles between men 
and women. Chattapadhyayvand and Duflo (2004) found differences in the invest-
ment policy of female and male policymakers in village councils of West Bengal 
and rajasthan, india where one-third of these councils must be headed by women 
since the mid-1990s. they compared the councils headed by women with those led 
by men. Women were found to invest more in public goods linked to women’s con-
cerns (drinking water, etc.) and invest less in public goods linked to men’s concerns 
(education, etc.), i.e. women leaders increase the provision of public goods that 
benefit women. their findings suggest that the gender of politicians influences policy 
decisions; a factor that might play an important role when assigning scarce eco-
nomic resources, especially in developing countries. Moreover, Duflo (2005) shows 
that there is a positive relationship between economic development and women’s 
empowerment. 
 As regards the acceptance of female leaders in a related context, King and Matland 
(2003) studied the effect of the gender of a Republican candidate on the electorate. 
They find that the candidate’s gender affects the possibility of being voted for, but the 
effect depends on the party affiliation of the voters. Being a female Republican can-
didate has a positive effect (in comparison to a male Republican candidate) among 
Democrats and independents, but a negative effect among republican voters. 
 these papers, among others, suggest that it is important to study the relationship 
between leadership and gender.
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 In an experiment with 288 first-year cadets at the US Military Academy, Rice, 
Bender, and Vitters (1980) studied the impact of the leader’s gender on group perfor-
mance and followers’ morale. Half of the groups had a male leader and half a female 
leader. All the followers were men (due to the scarcity of female cadets). Considering 
all the followers, they did not observe a strong negative bias in terms of the (male) 
followers evaluation of the female leaders. However, they did find differences when 
separating the groups between those whose followers held traditional views towards 
women and those with more liberal views. While the former evaluate female leaders 
worse than male leaders, the latter do the opposite. 
 In an economic experiment, Grossman and Komai (2008) examined whether there 
is a difference in leader’s and follower’s behavior across gender. in their public goods 
experiment, subjects interact in groups of three members, where the leader has pre-
cise information about the marginal return of the public good and the followers do not. 
the followers only know that there are three possible scenarios: scenarios 1 and 2, 
where it is socially beneficial to contribute to the public good; and Scenario 3, where 
there is no incentive to contribute (either from an individual or a social point of view). 
Although in Scenario 2 contributing is socially beneficial and free riding is a strictly 
dominant strategy, in scenario 1 it is not. they conducted two treatments: one where 
the leader’s gender is disclosed and one where it is not. they found a positive and 
significant relationship between the followers’ and leaders’ contributions, but did not 
find a significant correlation between the followers’ decision and their gender and the 
leader’s gender. What they did find is that the decisions made by female leaders are 
influenced by the treatment, whereas the males’ decisions are not: women contribute 
less to the public good in the treatment where their gender is disclosed to the follow-
ers. Grossman and Komai’s interpretation is that female leaders expect followers to 
contribute less when they know their gender than when they do not. this behavior is 
observed in scenario 2 where the leader’s payoff depends strongly on the followers’ 
contributions.
 Arbak and Villeval (2007) analyzed the willingness of subjects to lead their group 
despite the fact that doing so will be costly for them. they found that males are more 
enthusiastic about leading than females, but this difference vanishes when attributes 
(gender and the amount the subject has donated to a charity at the beginning of the 
experiment) are disclosed. Arbak and Villeval’s interpretation is that women need more 
information than men about their group members to be willing to lead (where leading is 
costly for them). 
 Kocher, Pogrebna and Sutter (2008) studied leadership through an experiment 
where subjects play in groups of three members and where they have to choose 
between two lotteries that they would like to play as a group. the leaders observe 
the decisions of the other members of the group, but can choose the type of lottery 
they prefer, considering or ignoring the other members’ preferences. they found that 
women are more likely to take into account the other members’ preferences than men 
do, i.e. men are more prone to overrule the team than women. therefore, given that 
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women tend to take into account the opinion of the other members of their team, they 
conclude that when organizations have a team-oriented philosophy of decision making, 
it would be convenient to promote female leaders. Chaganti (1986:28) (reviewed in 
Johnson and Powell 1994) found that female entrepreneurs “seem to prefer a more 
people-orientated and less autocratic management style,… their managerial styles in 
particular may be more feminine”.
diScuSSion
for several decades, researchers in the area of leadership have distinguished two 
types of behaviour: agentic, task-oriented behaviour versus communal, social-oriented 
behaviour (Berdahl 1996). This distinction runs parallel to the attributes traditiona-
lly associated with masculinity and feminity: agenticism (agenticism includes being 
assertive, controlling, ambitious, dominant, independent, self-confident and competi-
tive, among others) and communalism (communalism includes being concerned with 
caring, emotional, empathetic and supportive, among others), respectively. However, 
there is emerging evidence that women leaders may be more likely to ignore rules 
and take more risks than men (Greenberg and Sweeney 2005). Johnson and Powell 
(1994) review papers which suggest that risk taking differences between males and 
females might be influenced by the fact that such behavior is negatively valued in 
women and therefore women who take risks are unpopular. in contrast, the opposite is 
true for men as risk taking behaviour is viewed as a positive attribute and is culturally 
reinforced in males. Slovic (1966) showed that gender differences are observed once 
the children follow their expected sex-role stereotype. in spite of this and also the fact 
that women are evaluated negatively when they behave inconsistently with their sex 
role (Eagly, Wood and Dickman 2000), some women leaders are not bound by conven-
tional wisdom and are willing to take risks.
 recently, gender differences have been studied by neurobiology researchers. 
Their findings could explain the differences found in experimental economics. At the 
country level, Zack and Fakhar (2009) found that interpersonal trust may be related 
to the intake of neuroactive hormones. they found that consumption of estrogens and 
their presence in the environment are related to trust. this may partially explain gender 
differences in social behaviors. moreover, research supports the existence of differ-
ences in leadership styles between men and women. Nowack (2009) suggests that 
this difference may be due to at least one female hormone called oxytocin, which may 
affect the way women react under stress and explain why women do indeed lead dif-
ferently than men. Barraza and Zak (2009) show that empathy, trust and collaboration 
is boosted by oxytocin. Based on these findings, Nowack (2009) concludes that the 
gender difference due to oxytocin might contribute to explaining the observed ten-
dency among females to lead in a more participatory manner and to promote socially 
oriented behavior such as cooperation, team work and assisting co-workers.
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